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THE DOCTRINE OF REASONABLE
EXPECTATIONS IN INSURANCE LAW: WHAT
TO EXPECT IN WISCONSIN
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most controversial doctrines to emerge in insurance law
over the last thirty years is the doctrine of reasonable expectations.1 The
doctrine of reasonable expectations is a principle that relies on the
"'reasonable expectations of the insured"' as a guide for insurance
contract interpretation.2  Under the doctrine of "reasonable
expectations," courts often grant coverage to an insured even when the
express language of the policy does not provide coverage.3
In its strongest form, the doctrine of reasonable expectations goes
beyond contra proferentem, a traditional rule of interpretation.4 Contra
proferentem grants coverage to an insured by construing ambiguous
policy language against the insurance company.5 In contrast, the
doctrine of reasonable expectations grants coverage when the insured
has an objectively reasonable expectation of coverage even in the
absence of ambiguous insurance policy language.6
Different approaches to the doctrine have emerged, but the stronger
approaches, willing to ignore clear insurance contract language and
nonetheless honor the insured's reasonable expectations, have caused
the most controversy.7 Further, confusion still exists in understanding
and applying the doctrine even in those jurisdictions that have adopted
it.8 Critical issues remain, such as whether a particular jurisdiction has
1. Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Revisited, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 108
(1998).
2. Id. (quoting Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy
Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961,970 n.14 (1970)).
3. Id.
4. Eugene R. Anderson & James J. Fournier, Why Courts Enforce Insurance
Policyholders' Objectively Reasonable Expectations of Insurance Coverage, 5 CONN. INS. LJ.
335,342-45 (1998).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law
After Two Decades, 51 OHIO ST. LJ. 823,824 (1990).
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adopted the doctrine, and exactly what approach has been adopted.9
This Comment analyzes whether the Wisconsin Supreme Court has
adopted the doctrine of reasonable expectations. To provide the
necessary historical background, this Comment explores how other
jurisdictions have approached the doctrine. Part II explains the genesis
of the doctrine in American courts generally, while Part III describes the
evolution of four different approaches to the doctrine. Part IV analyzes
how the Wisconsin Supreme Court has applied this controversial
doctrine. Part V briefly discusses some of the criticisms of the doctrine
and determines which approach should be applied in Wisconsin courts.
Lastly, Part VI concludes that the Wisconsin Supreme Court should
continue to limit the doctrine of reasonable expectations to a rule of
insurance policy construction used to resolve ambiguities.
II. GENESIS OF THE REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS DoCrRINE
A. From Principle to Doctrine
In 1970, Professor Robert E. Keeton formulated a new insurance law
principle after reviewing numerous judicial opinions that he labeled as
"product[s] of unprincipled prejudice against insurers."1" He stated the
principle as follows: "'The objectively reasonable expectations of
applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance
contracts will be honored even though painstaking study of the policy
provisions would have negated those expectations.' "i Keeton supported
this principle by relying on the adhesive nature of insurance contracts
and the courts' willingness to look at the purchasers' expectations and
assumptions regarding coverage.
12
Keeton initially realized that this principle was too broad and
unrefined to serve as a doctrine, or as a set of rules, in insurance policy
interpretation.13 Keeton posited that the common law process would
have to slowly work out the specific rules and boundaries of this broad
principle. 4 Keeton believed his principle reflected a valid trend in
9. Id.
10. Id. at 825.
11. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Keeton, supra note 2, at 967).
12. Rahdert, supra note 1, at 108-09.
13. Henderson, supra note 8, at 825-26.
14. Id. Four different approaches to the doctrine eventually developed. See infra Part
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insurance law15 and invited courts to adopt it.16  Indeed, many
jurisdictions did adopt his principle and began the process of delineating
the boundaries and application of his principle into a doctrine. 7
However, different approaches to the principle"8 emerged in the
jurisdictions that adopted Keeton's broad principle. 9 Although these
developments caused considerable confusion, ° Keeton's basic principle
evolved into an important doctrine of insurance policy interpretation in
these jurisdictions.
Iowa and Arizona have extensively developed the substantive
boundaries of the doctrine.21 In 1973, Iowa adopted the doctrine in
Rodman v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co.22 and continued to
outline the doctrine's application and boundaries in C & J Fertilizer, Inc.
v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co.2 In C & J Fertilizer, Inc., an insured
brought an action seeking to collect under two burglary policies.24 Both
insurance policies unambiguously defined "burglary" as meaning:
[T]he felonious abstraction of insured property (1) from within
the premises by a person making felonious entry therein by
actual force and violence, of which force and violence there are
visible marks made by tools, explosives, electricity or chemicals
upon, or physical damage to, the exterior of the premises at the
place of such entry....
15. Henderson, supra note 8, at 825-26.
16. Rahdert, supra note 1, at 108-09.
17. Id.
18. See infra Part III; see also Jeffery W. Stempel, Unmet Expectations: Undue
Restriction of the Reasonable Expectations Approach and the Misleading Mythology of
Judicial Role, 5 CONN. INS. LJ. 181,193-94 (1998).
19. Compare C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 177 (Iowa
1975) (finding coverage based on the doctrine of reasonable expectations despite
unambiguous policy language defining "burglary"), with Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Sandbulte, 302 N.W.2d 104, 112 (Iowa 1981) (requiring ambiguous, bizarre, or oppressive
policy language to apply the doctrine of reasonable expectations).
20. See infra Part Ill.
21. Henderson, supra note 8, at 842.
22. 208 N.W.2d 903, 906 (Iowa 1973) ("'The objectively reasonable expectations of
applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be
honored even though painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated those
expectations.'") (quoting ROBERT E. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW-BASIC TEXT § 6.3(a), at
751 (1971)). By directly quoting Keeton's interpretation of his doctrine, Iowa appeared to
adopt his stronger version of the doctrine. But see supra note 20 and accompanying text.
23. 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975).
24. Id. at 171.
25. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting the insurance policy definition of burglary).
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The court determined that the evidence showed no visible marks or
damages on the exterior of the insured's property, but found visible
marks inside the premises.2 The court believed the insured would not
have "reasonably anticipate[d]" this definition of burglary from the
negotiations and communications with the insurance company's agent.,
The court also found that the burglary definition was inconsistent with
either a layman's definition or a legal definition.' Accordingly, the
court held that the doctrine of reasonable expectations applied and
demanded reversal and judgment for the insured.29
The Supreme Court of Arizona adopted the doctrine in Darner
Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co.,, but
significantly clarified the applicability of the doctrine in Gordinier v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co." In Gordinier, an insured brought an
action to recover uninsured motorist benefits after she was injured while
riding as a passenger on an uninsured motorcycle.2 At the time of the
accident, the plaintiff and her husband, the named insured, had
separated and were living at different locations." The insurer denied
payment to the plaintiff because she was an "additional driver" and not
a "'resident of the same household.' '" The court of appeals found the
limiting language of the policy unambiguous and held that the doctrine
of reasonable expectations, as adopted in Darner, did not apply to
unambiguous language."
The Supreme Court of Arizona, however, stated that the doctrine of
reasonable expectations could be applied to unambiguous language in
standardized insurance contracts in four situations:36
26. Id.
27. Id. at 177. The court also quoted extensively from the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 237 (1981) (now § 211): "[A] party who adheres to the other party's standard
terms does not assent to a term if the other party has reason to believe that the adhering party
would not have accepted the agreement if he had known that the agreement contained the
particular term." Id. at 176. "This rule is closely related to the policy against unconscionable
terms and the rule of interpretation against the draftsman." Id.
28. Id. at 177.
29. Id.
30. 682 P.2d 388, 397 (Ariz. 1984) (adopting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 211 (1981) as a "sensible rationale for interpretation of... usual type[s] of insuring
agreement[s]").
31. 742 P.2d 277 (Ariz. 1987).
32. Id. at 279.
33. Id. at 278.
34. Id. at 279,284 (quoting the insurance policy language).
35. Id. at 283.
36. Id.
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1. Where the contract terms, although not ambiguous to the
court, cannot be understood by the reasonably intelligent
consumer who might check on his or her rights, the court will
interpret them in light of the objective, reasonable expectations
of the average insured...,
2. Where the insured did not receive full and adequate notice of
the term in question, and the provision is either unusual or
unexpected, or one that emasculates apparent coverage...,
3. Where some activity which can be reasonably attributed to the
insurer would create an objective impression of coverage in the
mind of a reasonable insured...,
4. Where some activity reasonably attributable to the insurer has
induced a particular insured reasonably to believe that he has
coverage, although such coverage is expressly and
unambiguously denied by the policy ....
The court held that the policy language, which limited the plaintiff's
coverage, became unenforceable as a matter of law under Arizona's
version of the doctrine of reasonable expectations.38
Despite the proliferation of the doctrine in some jurisdictions, the
controversy surrounding the doctrine clearly prevents other jurisdictions
from accepting it." For example, Florida's highest court rejected the
doctrine in Deni Associates of Florida, Inc., v. State Farm Fire &
Casualty Insurance Co.4° In Deni, the Florida Supreme Court examined
Keeton's principle and stated that:
We decline to adopt the doctrine of reasonable expectations.
There is no need for it if the policy provisions are ambiguous
because in Florida ambiguities are construed against the insurer.
To apply the doctrine to an unambiguous provision would be to
rewrite the contract and the basis upon which the premiums are
charged.4
37. Id. at 283-84 (citing William A. Mayhew, Reasonable Expectations: Seeking a
Principled Application, 13 PEPP. L. REV. 267,287-89 (1986)).
38. Id. at 285. The case was remanded to determine if the plaintiff or the husband had
knowledge of the limitations. Id.
39. Rahdert, supra note 1, at 109.
40. 711 So. 2d 1135,1140 (Fla. 1998).
41. Id. (citing Sterling Merch. Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 506 N.E.2d 1192, 1197 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1986)). However, one commentator suggests that the Florida Supreme Court
misunderstood the doctrine. Anderson & Fournier, supra note 4, at 357.
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Likewise, Utah has refused to accept the doctrine. In Allen v.
Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Co.," the Utah Supreme
Court discussed the doctrine and held that "[a]doption of the reasonable
expectations doctrine poses a much greater risk of broadly undermining
[freedom of contract] than our continued use of existing equitable
doctrines applied on a case-by-case basis.'"3 Thus, as these cases
illustrate, many courts still view the doctrine as a vehicle for judicial
rewriting of unambiguous policy language and therefore have refused to
accept the doctrine.'
Other jurisdictions have flirted with the idea, but have not yet truly
accepted or rejected it. 5 For example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
has applied the doctrine of reasonable expectations, but has not
explicitly adopted it.46 The reluctance of some jurisdictions to adopt the
doctrine may be caused by the general confusion surrounding it.'
Different approaches to the doctrine have fueled this confusion."
Indeed, the doctrine may be best described as a "bundle of related
ideas" rather than "a single concept."
49
III. THE DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO THE DOCTRINE: WHY THE
DOCTRINE IS CONTROVERSIAL AND MISUNDERSTOOD
Commentators have outlined four different approaches to the
doctrine of reasonable expectations.: These four approaches range
42. 839 P.2d 798 (Utah 1992).
43. Id. at 807.
44. Rahdert, supra note 1, at 109.
45. Id.
46. See infra Part IV.
47. Rahdert, supra note 1, at 111.
48. See id. at 111-12.
49. Id. at 111.
50. Id. Other commentators outline different variations of the doctrine of reasonable
expectations. See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, A Critique of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine,
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1461, 1467-75 (1989) (outlining the "ambiguity," "fine print," and "whole
transaction" approaches to the doctrine of reasonable expectations). One commentator
suggests that the doctrine of reasonable expectations has two variations: "objective
reasonable expectations" and "subjective expectations." ARNOLD P. ANDERSON,
WISCONSIN INSURANCE LAW § 1.1 (4th ed. 1988). Objective reasonable expectations "is a
conventional use.., that construes the meaning of a specific word or phrase in an insurance
policy. This test of construction is: What a reasonable person in the position of the insured
would understand specific words to mean." Id. In contrast, "[i]n applying subjective
reasonable expectations, a court bases an interpretation on whether an insured would
reasonably expect to be covered because of the general nature of [insurance] coverage
purchased, in other words, 'theft,' 'liability,' and the like." Id.
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along a continuum from traditional policy interpretation rules to
"downright dangerous" judicial manipulation of insurance policy
language. 1 Further, these four approaches are "interrelated [and] often
overlap."' 2 As such, commentators have suggested that courts often
apply more than one of these approaches to justify their decisions. 3
Thus, how one jurisdiction construes a policy according to the insured's
"reasonable expectations" may differ markedly from another
jurisdiction's approach."
A. Ambiguity and Traditional Insurance Policy Rules of Construction
Some courts apply the doctrine of reasonable expectations only
when policy language is ambiguous.55 Policy language is ambiguous if it
is reasonably or fairly susceptible to more than one meaning and the
different meanings have opposite effects on coverage.56 This approach
holds that if a policy is ambiguous, the court construes the language
against the insurer and in favor of the insured.' This approach parallels
contra proferentem, a traditional contract interpretation canon that
construes ambiguity against the drafter.
Under the ambiguity approach, courts apply the basic premise of
contra proferentern in the context of insurance contracts. In the
overwhelming majority of insurance contracts, the insurer unilaterally
drafts the terms of coverage.0 Further, modem contract theory holds
51. Rahdert, supra note 1, at 111.
52. Id. at 144.
53. Id. at 144-46.
54. Anderson & Fournier, supra note 4, at 356.
55. See, e.g., Lutsky v. Blue Cross Hosp. Serv. Inc., 695 S.W.2d 870, 875 (Mo. 1985)
(applying the doctrine of reasonable expectations where the policy language was ambiguous);
Waylett v. United Servs. Auto. Assoc., 401 N.W.2d 160, 163 (Neb. 1987) (stating that "'[i]n
view of the language used [in the policy,] the plaintiff could have no reasonable expectation
that the policy did not mean exactly what it said'") (quoting Pettid v. Edwards, 240 N.W.2d
344,346-47 (Neb. 1976)).
56. Rahdert, supra note 1, at 116. In Wisconsin, "Words or phrases in a contract are
ambiguous when they are reasonably or fairly susceptible to more than one construction."
Katze v. Randolph & Scott Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 330 N.W2d 232 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983), revd,
341 N.W.2d 689, 692 (Wis. 1984). In addition, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has "held
consistently... that the construction.of the words and clauses in an insurance policy is a
question of law for the court." Id. at 691.
57. Rahdert, supra note 1, at 116.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. Most insurance polices are standard-form policies. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM,
INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 32 (3d ed. 2000).
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that the insurer must effectively and clearly communicate these terms to
the insured." Essentially, this approach puts the insurer on notice as
follows: "'Cover what you want. Exclude what you want. But make
sure you do it clearly. Sloppy drafting could cost you something.' 6 2
The Nevada Supreme Court decision of National Union Fire
Insurance Co. v. Reno's Executive Air Inc." illustrates the ambiguity
approach to the doctrine of reasonable expectations.6 In National
Union, an air taxi operator purchased aviation liability insurance for his
helicopter. 5 The liability policy excluded property "carried in or on any
aircraft with respect to which... this policy applies."6 After hitting
power lines, the operator crashed his helicopter and damaged a
passenger's photography equipment. 7 The insurer denied coverage
because the passenger's photography equipment was "carried in or on"
the helicopter.6
The court believed the exclusion to be ambiguous because the policy
did "not specify in whose possession property 'carried in or on [the]
aircraft' must be before the exclusion applies."69 The court noted that
an insured "reasonably expects that the policy will cover... property of
others carried on board the aircraft."70 The court held that the exclusion
did not apply, and therefore the liability policy provided coverage for
the passenger's equipment.7'
Most commentators view this approach as the least controversial
because it is based upon traditional contract interpretation canons of
"noble common law pedigree." 2 However, the threshold issue of
whether insurance contract language is ambiguous continues to cause
61. Rahdert, supra note 1, at 116.
62. Id. at 117.
63. 682 P.2d 1380 (Nev. 1984).
64. See also Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co. v. Wasmuth, 432 N.W.2d 495,500 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1988) (resolving ambiguity in favor of the insured's "reasonable" understanding).
65. National Union, 682 P.2d at 1381. Liability insurance covers claims "against the
insured for such damages as injury or death to other drivers or passengers, property damage,
and the like." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 805 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added).
66. National Union, 682 P.2d at 1382 (quoting insurance policy language).
67. Id. The owner of the photography equipment brought suit against the air taxi
operator to recover the value of his equipment and eventually obtained judgment against the
operator for $41,000. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1382-83 (alteration in original) (quoting insurance policy language).
70. Id. at 1383-84.
71. Id. at 1384.
72. Rahdert, supra note 1, at 116.
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dissension among courts.' Thus, judicial disagreement over the issue of
ambiguity impacts the application of this approach to the doctrine of
reasonable expectations.
B. Avoiding Unfair Results
Some courts utilize the doctrine of reasonable expectations to avoid
an unfair or "unconscionable" result.74 These courts are willing to
ignore clear policy language in order to ensure the "basic fairness of
policy terms and procedures. " 7 Proponents of this approach argue that
insurance policies are "examples par excellence of adhesion contracts. "76
Proponents argue that the insurer obtains "extraordinary control" over
the terms of coverage by knowing critical industry practice and detailed
risk determinations.7 In addition, supporters of this approach note that
insurers realize that most insureds do not read, let alone understand,
their insurance policies As a result, these proponents argue that
courts must "police" the fairness of the insurance policy. 
7
The "fairness" approach protects against three inequitable
circumstances: 1) "procedural unfairness," where insurance marketing
causes the insured to expect coverage even though the policy explicitly
excludes coverage; 2) "structural unfairness," where the layout and
organization of the insurance policy can cause an insured to become
confused and wary; and 3) "situational unfairness," where standard-
73. See, e.g., Peace v. N.W. Nat. Ins. Co., 596 N.W.2d 429, 449 (Wis. 1999) (Crooks, J.,
dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority's holding that the insurance policy was
unambiguous).
74. Rahdert, supra note 1, at 126.
75. Id. at 127.
76. Id. However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court does not believe that insurance policies
are adhesion contracts. Katze v. Randolph & Scott Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 341 N.W.2d 689, 691
(Wis. 1984). In Katze, the court opined that "[tihe court of appeals identified this insurance
policy as a contract of adhesion. We disavow that categorization of the policy. This court has
not labeled insurance policies as contracts of adhesion which have been defined as form
contracts submitted on a 'take it or leave it' basis." Id. In addition, the court stated:
To sweep out in a single labeling of adhesion contract the well-established case law
used in the interpretation of insurance contracts would not be of service to the
public. We do not superimpose the case law of other jurisdictions regarding
contracts of adhesion on this insurance policy. There are sufficient rules of
interpretation of the policy and its meaning available.
Id. at 692.
77. Rahdert, supra note 1, at 127.
78. Id. at 128.
79. Id. at 127.
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form insurance policies result in unfair coverage restrictions when
applied to a unique policyholder."
The New Hampshire Supreme Court decision of Atwood v. Hartford
Accident Indemnity Co.,"+ exemplifies the "fairness" approach to the
doctrine.2 In Atwood, a self-employed electrician repaired a thermostat
in an apartment building.' After the electrician's repair, a child died
from heat-related complications. ' The electrician's insurer refused to
defend the electrician and would not indemnify him for any damages
assessed against him.' The insurer claimed that a "completed
operations" exclusion applied and negated coverage for the electrician.'
The trial court noted that "'[a] reasonable person in the position of
the [electrician] would have believed that he was covered by the policy
for any claims against him for negligence in his work as an electrician.""
Further, the trial court critically analyzed the language and structure of
the policy and believed that "[t]here is little in the language and
arrangement of this policy which would lead the ordinary person to
believe that he had no coverage for injury or property damage which
arose after he completed a job.""
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire agreed with the trial court's
analysis. 9 In addition, the court relied on the insurance agent's beliefs."
80. Id. at 128.
81. 365 A.2d 744 (N.H. 1976).
82. See also Gordinier v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 742 P.2d 277, 289 (Ariz. 1987) (holding
that a limitation on coverage was unenforceable because of inadequate notice); Bromfeld v.
Harleysville Ins. Cos., 688 A.2d 1114, 1123 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (directing the
lower court to "look at the reasonable expectations of the average home owner" where the
structure of the policy is complicated).
83. Atwood, 365 A.2d at 745.
84. Id.
85. Id. The child's estate brought suit against the electrician, and a third party also
sought indemnity from the electrician. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 746 (quoting the trial court's findings).
88. Id.
89. Id. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire commented on the liability policy's
layout as follows:
The critical heading [of the policy], which is located between two other headings,
reads as follows: "Coverage for Premises and for the Named Insured's Operations in
Progress." It is possible to look through the document several times before noticing
this heading. Yet this is the only affirmative statement of the coverage of the policy.
The defendant also relies on [the completed operations exclusion].... This
exclusion clause is buried amidst thirteen others, which are either irrelevant to the
plaintiff or expected, as for example the exclusion of obligations imposed by
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The court opined that "[i]f an insurance agent with twenty years of
experience thought that [the electrician] was covered for completed
operations, it is unreasonable to expect [the electrician], who had no
experience with reading insurance policies, to know that he was not so
covered."91  As a result, the court held that the policy covered the
electrician's negligent repair.9
Not surprising, this approach to the doctrine of reasonable
expectations is controversial.93 The major criticisms of this approach
include judicial manipulation of clear policy language, disregarded
insurance contract language, and increased premium costs.94
C. Promoting the Purpose of Insurance
In very rare instances, courts apply the doctrine of reasonable
expectations to promote the purpose of insurance.' Here, courts are
primarily concerned with "mak[ing] an insurance policy perform its
intended function."9 In some circumstances, courts realize that strict
enforcement of written policy language would eviscerate the underlying
purpose of the insurance transaction.' As a result, some courts invoke
the doctrine of reasonable expectations to justify their actions when they
refuse to enforce written policy language.9
The Wisconsin Supreme Court decision of Wood v. American Family
Insurance Co.9 illustrates the "purpose" approach to the doctrine."° In
Wood, an insured's wife was killed in a head-on collision with an
underinsured motorist.10' The insured sought to recover damages for his
workmen's compensation and unemployment compensation laws. Neither the
quoted heading nor the quoted exclusion clause constitutes fair notice to the insured
that the policy does not cover the risks defined as the completed operations hazard,
which the front page would lead him to believe were covered.
Id. at 746-47 (quoting insurance policy language).
90. Id. at 747.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Rahdert, supra note 1, at 131.
94. Id. See infra Part V for a discussion of these criticisms.
95. Rahdert, supra note 1, at 136.
96. Id. Courts also use this approach to protect not only the insured before the court,
but also other insureds who purchase similar insurance. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. 436 N.W.2d 594 (Wis. 1989).
100. Rahdert, supra note 1, at 137.
101. Wood, 436 N.W.2d at 595-96. The same insurance company insured the vehicle
driven by the insured's wife and also another vehicle owned by the insured. Id. Thus, the
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wife's death under the underinsured motorist provisions in each of his
insurance policies.'02 However, the insurance company claimed that the
"reducing clause" in each of the insured's policies reduced the amount
the insured could recover."
After finding the phrase "amounts payable" within the reducing
clause ambiguous, the court construed the phrase according to the
insured's reasonable expectations. 10' The court found that a reasonable
insured would understand "amounts payable" to mean the total amount
of damages sustained because:
[A] reasonable insured expects to be protected against a loss
caused by another that is not covered by the underinsured
driver's liability coverage.
Furthermore, this interpretation is consistent with the
purpose of UIM coverage as announced by this court. The
purpose of UIM coverage is to compensate the victim of an
underinsured motorist's negligence where the third party's
liability limits are not adequate to fully compensate the victim for
his or her injuries. °5
Based on these arguments, the court held that the "reducing clause"
did not reduce the amount payable under the policy "by the amount
received by the insured from the underinsured driver's liability
policy. " "'
This approach to the doctrine of reasonable expectations is also
controversial."° Under this approach, courts no longer umpire the
insured had two insurance policies. Id.
102. Id. at 596. The insured sought to "stack" or combine the coverage afforded by both
policies. Id. Specifically, the insured wanted to collect the $100,000 limit afforded under one
policy and $100,000 under the other insurance policy. Id. The insured had total damages of
more than $225,000. Id.
103. Id. The insurer argued that the "amounts payable" to the insured totaled only
$75,000 because the insured received $25,000 from the underinsured motorist's liability
policy. Id. at 600. According to the insurer, the $25,000 had to be subtracted from the
$100,000 underinsured motorist limits per the terms of the reducing clause. Id. However, the
court held that the insured was entitled to stack coverage, but it had to determine how to
apply the reducing clause in order to determine the "amounts payable" to the insured. Id. at
598-99.
104. Id. at 599.
105. Id. (citing Schwochert v. Am. Family Ins. Co., 407 N.W.2d 525 (Wis. 1987)).
106. Id. at 601.
107. Rahdert, supra note 1, at 139.
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bargain struck between the insurer and insured."' Thus, by analyzing
the purpose of the insurance transaction and then determining what
should be covered, courts assume the role of a legislative body and
therefore stray from their traditional judicial role."
D. Protection of Third-Party Interests
In extremely rare cases, courts apply the doctrine of reasonable
expectations to protect the interests of third parties."' Because
insurance coverage impacts third parties such as family members,
employees, and innocent victims of the insured, third parties have an
"interest in how insurance policies are interpreted" and construed.' In
turn, courts protect this interest by invoking the doctrine of reasonable
expectations."
In Harvester Chemical Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,' the
Superior Court of New Jersey applied the "third-party protection"
approach of the doctrine of reasonable expectations. 4 In Harvester, a
liability insurer terminated an insured's policy mid-term for
"'underwriting considerations."'"" 5 Immediately after the termination
date, the insured tried to find new insurance but was unable to obtain
coverage."6  Approximately four months after the policy was
terminated, a third party was severely burned by one of the insured's
products.' The injured third party brought a personal injury claim
against the insured.
108. Id. at 140.
109. Id.
110. See id. at 140-41.
111. Id. at 141. This application of the doctrine most often arises in liability insurance
cases. Id.
112. Id.
113. 649 A2d 1296 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994).
114. Id. at 1301; see also Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1041 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (applying the reasonable expectations of an insured in order to determine what
triggers coverage for asbestos-related diseases of third-parties).
115. Harvester, 649 A.2d at 1298 (quoting the insurer's reason for termination). The
policy read as follows: "With respect to the cancellation for any reason other than
nonpayment of premium, this policy may be canceled by mailing to the named insured...
written notice stating when not less than thirty days thereafter, such cancellation shall be
effective." Id. The insurer claimed that "underwriting reason[s]" constituted "'any' reason"
to cancel. Id. (quoting insurance policy language).
116. Id. The insured manufactured dangerous chemicals. Id.
117. Id. at 1299.
118. Id. The insurer denied coverage for this claim based on the assertion that the policy
was terminated. Id.
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After discussing prevailing public policy and precedent,119 the court
asserted that a thirty-day cancellation clause did not "fulfill" the
reasonable expectation of the insured because the insured had
bargained for one year of coverage. The court felt "[b]oth the
insured.., and innocent third-party beneficiaries... depend upon
insurers to keep their promises of coverage without resorting to a 'catch-
all' safety valve that permits the insurer to arbitrarily withdraw from its
promise before the end of the policy term.,
12
'
Further, the court believed that "[n]otice requirements are designed
to prevent a lapse in coverage not only for insureds, but also to protect
innocent third parties since lapse of coverage could translate into
uncompensated injury that ought rightfully be remunerated."'2' The court
remanded the case to determine if the insured had received proper
cancellation notice and if so, whether the insurer had an objective and
reasonable reason to cancel the policy mid-term." Finally, the court
noted that if the insured did not receive notice or if no valid reason
existed for the cancellation, the insurer would be required to cover the
third-party claim."
IV. How WISCONSIN APPROACHES THE DOCTRINE OF REASONABLE
EXPECTATIONS
Unlike some jurisdictions, " the Wisconsin Supreme Court has not
explicitly adopted the doctrine of reasonable expectations.
Nevertheless, the following case law illustrates how the court applies the
doctrine of reasonable expectations.
119. Id. at 1299-1302. The court stated that "[t]he ability to arbitrarily terminate an
insurance policy mid-term violates the tenets of good faith.., required of insurers." Id. at
1301.
120. Id.
121. Id. (emphasis added).
122. Id. at 1302 n.8 (emphasis added). The insured's broker had notice of cancellation,
but it was unclear whether the insured actually received notice. Id. at 1302.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., Max True Plastering Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 912 P.2d 861, 870 (Okla.
1996) (holding "that the doctrine of reasonable expectations may be applicable to the
interpretation of insurance contracts in Oklahoma, and that the doctrine may apply to
ambiguous contract language or to exclusions which are masked by technical or obscure
language or which are hidden in a policy's provisions"). Thirty-eight states "'have recognized
some variation of the reasonable expectations doctrine.'" Stempel, supra note 19, at 191
(quoting BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS P. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE
COVERAGE § 1.03(b), at 22 (9th ed. 1998)).
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A. Supreme Court of Wisconsin Case Law
1. Katze v. Randolph & Scott Mutual Fire Insurance Co."u
In the majority of insurance policy interpretation cases, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court applies the doctrine of reasonable
expectations as a tool of construction to resolve ambiguity."i For
example, in Katze v. Randolph & Scott Mutual Fire Insurance Co., the
court applied the doctrine as a tool of construction to resolve ambiguity.
In Katze, a farmer brought an action to recover under the theft
provisions of his insurance policy.1" The farmer was not paid after he
delivered sixty-three cattle to a fraudulent buyer. 29
The court needed to determine whether the farmer's failed
transaction with the fraudulent buyer was a "theft" under the policy and
whether the transaction resulted in a direct loss of cattle. 3° First, the
court held that the term "theft" was ambiguous in the policy."' After
further analysis of the policy's provisions, the court remarked that
"[t]here is no plain meaning to the word 'theft.' 3 2  Next, the court
126. 341 N.W.2d 689 (Wis. 1984).
127. See generally Dowhower v. W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 613 N.W.2d 557, 565 (2000)
(remanding the case to the lower court to determine whether a clause in an underinsured
motorist provision was ambiguous, and if so, whether a reasonable person in the position of
the insured would have understood the policy to mean that the coverage limit of policy was
the maximum recovery allowed); Peace v. N.W. Nat. Ins. Co., 596 N.W.2d 429, 448 (Wis.
1999) (holding that a reasonable insured property owner would believe, based on the terms of
the policy, that lead present in paint was a pollutant); Sprangers v. Greatway Ins. Co., 514
N.W.2d 1, 7 (Wis. 1994) (holding that a "reasonable person in the position of the insured
would have understood [a store] was in the business of... selling... [and] serving...
alcoholic beverages and therefore excluded from coverage") (internal quotations omitted);
Guenther v. City of Onalaska, 588 N.W.2d 375, 379-80 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that a
reasonable insured would expect coverage under his insurance policy when sewage backed up
into his basement); Shea v. Haas, Nos. 99-3330 & 00-0295, 2000 WL 1863568, at *3 (Wis. Ct.
App. Dec. 21, 2000) (holding that the "policy is not ambiguous because a reasonable person
in the position of the insured would not have understood the terms 'bodily injury arising out
of the ... use [or] occupancy... of any motorized land vehicle' to be limited to an insured's
use or occupancy" of his vehicle) (alteration in original).
128. Katze, 341 N.W.2d at 689. The policy defined "theft" as "any act of stealing...."
Id. at 691.
129. Id. at 690. As part of a fraudulent plan, the buyer immediately sold the farmer's
cattle upon delivery. Ic. The buyer was later prosecuted for issuing a worthless check to the
farmer. Id.
130. Id. at 689.
131. Id. at 691. The policy's exclusions to the theft provision did not help define the
term "theft." Id.
132. Id. at 692 (quoting insurance policy language). The court believed "theft" was a
broad term that included many different acts. Id. at 691.
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outlined "the rule in resolving ambiguity in insurance contracts" ' as
follows:
"In the case of an insurance contract, the words are to be
construed in accordance with the principle that the test is not
what the insurer intended the words to mean but what a
reasonable person in the position of an insured would have
understood the words to mean. Whatever ambiguity exists in a
contract of insurance is resolved in favor of the insured." 13
After applying this rule, the court held that it was reasonable to believe
that "theft" as used in the policy included the farmer's failed transaction
with the fraudulent buyer.1
5
However, the court stated that the homeowner's policy insures
"against direct loss to the property covered" and believed that the
insured's "direct loss" was money, not cattle. 36 The court noted that
"[i]t is not reasonable nor would a reasonable insured contemplate that
the theft coverage provided by this farmowner's policy extended to the
very substantial credit and business loss risks.""'n Further, the court
opined that "[a] reasonable insured would not have assumed that the
policy covered unsuccessful credit transactions in the cattle dealer
business. "'3 As such, the court held that the farmer's direct loss was in
money, not cattle, and therefore denied coverage.
39
2. Gross v. Lloyds of London Insurance Co."4'
In Gross v. Lloyds of London Insurance Co., the Wisconsin Supreme
Court moved beyond using the doctrine of reasonable expectations as a
133. Id. at 692.
134. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Garriguenc v. Love, 226 N.W.2d 414, 417 (Wis.
1974)). The Garriguenc court stated that this test "is a restatement of the general rule that
ambiguous contracts are to be construed most strongly against the maker or drafter."
Garriguenc, 226 N.W.2d at 417.
135. Katze, 341 N.W.2d at 692. The court focused on the policy's listed exclusions to
theft. Id. Because the insurer did not mention fraudulent transactions within its list of
exclusions, the court felt the insurer did not intend to exclude fraudulent transactions. Id.
136. Id. at 693.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. The court stated that "[t]o hold otherwise would in effect hold that the policy
insures the consideration in business transactions or that [the insured] was insured against a
lack of prudence in making a bad bargain." Id.
140. 358 N.W.2d 266 (Wis. 1984).
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rule of construction and applied it to avoid an unconscionable or unfair
result.'41 In Gross, an insured completed a renewal application for
aircraft liability insurance.42 The insurer's renewal application was in
the form of a conditional binder.1 43 Before the insurer issued the actual
policy, the insured's unoccupied plane broke loose and caused extensive
bodily injury to a spectator' 44 The injured party refused to settle and
brought suit against the insured and the insurer."45 According to the
terms of a "tendered for settlements" provision in the policy, the insurer
wished to pay its policy limit and be relieved of its duty to defend the
insured.46
However, the insured did not have notice of the "tendered for
settlements" provision.'47 Although the actual policy did contain the
provision, the insurer issued the policy to the insured four days after the
accident." Likewise, the binder did not contain the "tendered for
settlements" provision .14  The "tendered for settlements" provision
reflected a "substantial change" to the insurer's duty to defend and no
other jurisdiction, including Wisconsin, had yet construed a similar
provision.' Thus, the court had to decide whether the "tendered for
settlements" provision was enforceable'
First, the court discussed its approach by stating that "[w]hen
construing language covering an obligation such as the insurer's duty to
defend the insured, courts must look to the reasonable expectations of
141. This is consistent with the second approach outlined supra Part III.
142. Gross, 358 N.W.2d at 268. Under a policy of liability insurance, the insurer has the
duty to defend and indemnify the insured. Id. at 269. The insurer's duty to defend is broader
than the duty to indemnify. ABRAHAM, supra note 61, at 511.
143. Gross, 358 N.W.2d at 268. A binder gives the insured protection pending
investigation and issuance of the actual policy. BLACK's LAW DICrIoNARY 169 (6th ed.
1990). Moreover, "[blinders are an integral part of the insurance industry, and insureds rely
on binders to afford them the same coverage they would have under an issued policy." Gross,
358 N.W.2d at 271.
144. Id. at 268.
145. Id.
146. Id. The "tendered for settlements" provision allowed the insurer to terminate its
duty to defend once the insurer tendered the policy limits for settlement. Id. at 269.
147. Id. at 269. The original liability policy that the insured wished to renew was not
made part of the record. I&t
148. Id. at 268 n.4.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 269-70. In 1966, insurers revised standard form liability insurance polices to
clarify when their duty to defend the insured had been satisfied. Id. at 270. However, the
court felt that the "tendered for settlements" provision "is a further revision in the language
of liability insurance policies which first appeared [in 1966]." Id.
151. Id. at 269.
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the insured."152 The court noted that the insurer did not highlight the
new "tendered for settlements" language in the policy."' As a result, the
court believed the insurer did not give the insured notice that it changed
its 1966 standard liability policy language with respect to its duty to
defend."" The court opined that "[w]e believe the reasonable
expectations of insureds would be that the policy language in use by the
[insurance] industry since 1966 would be present in new policies unless
they were specifically given notice of a change.""' Moreover, the court
noted that "[b]ecause the binder was silent concerning [the insurer's]
obligation to defend, the reasonable expectation of an insured would be
that the standard industry practice would apply."'56  Ultimately, the
court held that the insurer had a duty to defend the insured even though
it tendered a settlement equal to the policy limits."5
The holding in Gross supports the court's willingness to apply the
doctrine of reasonable expectations to avoid "unconscionable" results
and avoid both "procedural unfairness" and "structural unfairness in
insurance policies."158
152. Id. at 271 (citing Kocse v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 387 A.2d 1259 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1978)).
153. Id. The insurer simply added the "tendered for settlements" provision to the end of
a sentence. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. However, one could argue that a reasonable insured would not believe that
standard industry practice would govern the interpretation of his policy. For example, if a
"reasonable insured" was asked whether the specific terms of his insurance policy would apply
or whether standard industry language would apply to a coverage determination under his
policy, he would more likely "reasonably expect" that his own policy's language would
control. Thus, the court's reasoning turns on what a reasonable insured believes or expects,
but does not elaborate on who or what is a "reasonable insured." For a discussion of this
issue, see infra Part V.
157. Id. Although the court did not relieve the insurer from its duty to defend, this
decision did contain a silver lining for insurers. The court discussed methods by which the
insurance company could be relieved of its duty to defend in the future. Id. First, new policy
language, such as "the 'tendered for settlements' language must be highlighted in the policy
and binder by means of conspicuous print, such as bold, italicized, or colored type, which
gives clear notice to the insured.... " Id. Moreover, "[iun cases where the insurer issues a
binder and the policy to be issued will contain the 'tendered for settlements' language, the
binder must also contain that language in conspicuous print, and the insured must be
furnished with a copy of the binder." Id. at 272-73. Thus, the court allowed insurers to adopt
this new language regarding an insurer's duty to defend, but stressed that the insured must
have notice of the changes.
158. See supra Part III.B (discussing procedural and structural unfairness).
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3. Theis v. Midwest Security Insurance Co. 9
In Theis v. Midwest Security Insurance Co., the Wisconsin Supreme
Court applied the doctrine of reasonable expectations to promote the
purpose of uninsured motorist insurance.O In Theis, an insured was
driving a truck on a highway when an unidentified truck passed him on
the right."' After the unidentified truck passed the insured's truck, the
insured saw a dark object flying toward his windshield.6 2 The object
smashed through the windshield of the insured's truck and injured the
insured.'6
The passing truck caused the object to hit the insured's windshield,
but it was unclear whether the object originated from the passing truck
or another unidentified vehicle.'6 The insured sought coverage under
the uninsured motorist provision of his policy, but the insurer denied
coverage." The insured then brought a declaratory judgment action
159. 606 N.W.2d 162 (Wis. 2000).
160. "The primary purpose of the uninsured motorist statute is to compensate an injured
person... to the same extent as if the uninsured motorist were insured." Id. at 167.
Moreover, this application of the doctrine of reasonable expectations is consistent with Wood
v. American Family Ins., as discussed supra Part III.
161. Id. at 163-64.
162. Id. at 164. The insured first saw this debris when the back of the passing truck was
about thirty feet ahead of the insured's truck. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. The object was found to be a leaf spring, which is part of a truck's suspension.
Id.
165. Id. The insurer claimed that the insured's injury was not covered by the uninsured
motorist provision. Id. The court cites the relevant part of the policy as follows:
PART C - UNINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE
Insuring Agreement
A. We will pay compensatory damages which an "insured" is legally entitled to
recover from the owner or operator of an "uninsured motor vehicle" because of a
"bodily injury":
1. Sustained by an "insured"; and
2. Caused by an accident ....
C. "Uninsured motor vehicle" means a land motor vehicle or trailer of any type:
3. Which is a hit-and-run vehicle whose operator or owner cannot be identified and
which hits:
a. You or any "family member"
b. A vehicle which you or any "family member" are "occupying"; or
c. "Your covered auto".
Id. at 164 n.2 (alterations in original).
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seeking to determine that he had coverage for the accident.1"
The court had to determine whether Wisconsin's uninsured motorist
statute compelled the insurer to provide coverage to the insured.
17
More specifically, the court had to determine whether a piece of an
unidentified motor vehicle that comes into physical contact with an
insured's vehicle satisfies a "hit" under the terms of the statute.16 The
court found that the language of the uninsured motorist statute, relevant
case law, and the legislative history did not "mandate[]" a decision of
this issue.16' As such, the court looked to three legislative purposes
behind the uninsured motorist statute and its language in order to
"discern legislative intent. ,171
166. Id. at 164. If the court deemed the insured to be covered, the insured could then
proceed with arbitration under the terms of the policy. Id.
167. Id. at 165. Section 632.32(4) of the Wisconsin Statutes requires insurers to provide
uninsured motorist coverage. The relevant part of the statute reads as follows:
(4) REQUIRED UNINSURED MOTORIST AND MEDICAL PAYMENTS
COVERAGES. Every policy of insurance subject to this section that insures with
respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state against
loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death suffered by any
person arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle shall
contain therein or supplemental thereto provisions approved by the [insurance]
commissioner:
(a) Uninsured motorist 1. For the protection of persons injured who are legally
entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles
because of bodily injury.., in limits of at least $25,000 per person and $50,000 per
accident.
2. In this paragraph "uninsured motor vehicle" also includes:
b. An unidentified motor vehicle involved in a hit-and-run accident.
Wis. STAT. § 632.32(4) (1999-2000). If a statute requires insurance coverage, courts compel
coverage even if the terms of a particular policy do not provide coverage or exclude coverage.
Theis, 606 N.W.2d at 165 (citing Hayne v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 339 N.W.2d 588, 590 (Wis.
1983)).
168. Theis, 606 N.W.2d at 165. The court found that the first and third elements of the
uninsured motorist statute were satisfied: (1) An unidentified motor vehicle caused the harm,
and (3) the unidentified motor vehicle fled the scene. Id.
169. Id. at 167.
170. Id. The court stated two other purposes underlying the uninsured motorist statute:
First, the court discussed the "primary purpose" of compensating injured persons. Id.
Second, the court discussed the purpose of the phrase "hit-and-run accident" within the
statute. Id. at 168. The legislature did not define "hit" or "hit-and-run" as used in the statute.
Id. at 166. The Legislative Council Note states that "[a] precise definition of hit-and-run is
not necessary for in the rare case where a question arises, the court can draw the line." Id. at
166 n.3. Wisconsin courts have drawn the line and interpret this phrase as requiring "physical
contact between the insured and the unidentified motor vehicle [in order to avoid] fraudulent
claim[s]." Id. at 168. However, the court thought that "it seems unlikely that future claimants
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During this analysis, the court found that "[another] purpose of the
[uninsured motorist] statute is that the reasonable coverage expectations
of an insured should be honored."'" The court examined the court of
appeals' analysis of the policy language and the insured's reasonable
coverage expectations.'
The court of appeals concludes that because the insurance policy
promises to pay compensatory damages for injuries an insured
suffers "arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use" of an
uninsured notor vehicle, a reasonable insured would expect
coverage when an unidentified motor vehicle propels a detached
piece of an unidentified motor vehicle into the insured's vehicle.7'
will be able to fraudulently assert that a piece from an unidentified motor vehicle was
propelled into their vehicle by an unidentified motor vehicle." Id. Thus, the court believed
that the "policy of preventing fraudll" was not present in the case. Id.
171. Id. In support of this proposition, the court cites three authorities. Id. at 168 n.9.
First, the court cites Kremers-Urban Co. v. Am. Employers Ins. Co., 351 N.W.2d 156 (Wis.
1984). Theis, 606 N.W.2d at 168 n.9. See infra notes 177-91 and accompanying text for a
detailed discussion of this case. Second, the court cites Handal v. Am. Farmers Mut. Cas. Co.,
255 N.W.2d 903, 908 (Wis. 1977). Theis, 606 N.W.2d at 168 n.9. This cite mystifies the author.
The court in Handal applied Iowa law when it interpreted the insurance policy at issue.
Handal, 255 N.W.2d at 906 (stating that "the trial court correctly concluded that the law of
Iowa controls"). In Handal, the court focused on the reasonable expectations of the named
insured and her son. Id. at 908. The court documented a series of letters sent between the
named insured's husband and the automobile insurer regarding coverage for the insured's
son. Id. Although the court held one of the letters to be ambiguous, the court believed that
"[ain average reasonable person could understand [the ambiguous sentence] to mean that
[the son] was protected by the policy." Id. at 907. After this correspondence, the son was
involved in an automobile accident in Wisconsin. Id. The insurer denied coverage because
the named insured did not notify the insurer that the insured's car was kept in Wisconsin. Id.
at 908. However, the court held that the insurer could not deny coverage because
[t]he public policy which supports such a holding has been described as the principle
of honoring reasonable expectations. This principle states that "objectively
reasonable expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms
of insurance contracts will be honored even though painstaking study of the policy
provisions would have negated those expectations."
Id. (citing ROBERT E. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW-BASIC TEXT (1971)). Assuming the
court's citation to Handal supports its agreement with Iowa's rules of insurance policy
interpretation, the court would seem to have adopted Keeton's stronger approach to the
doctrine of reasonable expectations. See supra Part II for a discussion of Iowa's approach to
the doctrine of reasonable expectations before 1981; see also supra notes 21-29. However,
whether the Wisconsin Supreme Court adopts this stronger version remains unclear because,
as noted earlier, it most often applies the doctrine of reasonable expectations as a rule of
insurance policy interpretation to resolve ambiguity. See supra Part IV.A.1. Third, the court
cites Patrick v. Head of Lakes Coop. Elec. Ass'n, 295 N.W.2d 205 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980).
172. Theis, 606 N.W.2d at 168.
173. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting insurance policy language).
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The Wisconsin Supreme Court agreed with this reasoning.74 Relying
on this purpose and the other two purposes of the statute, '75 the court
held that the uninsured motorist statute "requires that the uninsured
motorist clauses of an insurance policy provide coverage when a
detached piece of an unidentified motor vehicle is propelled into the
insured's motor vehicle by an unidentified motor vehicle."'76
4. Kremers-Urban Co. v. American Employers Insurance Co.'"
The Wisconsin Supreme Court decision of Kremers-Urban Co. v.
American Employers Insurance Co. applied the doctrine of reasonable
expectations to protect the interests of third parties.'78 In Kremers, a
pharmaceutical manufacturer brought a declaratory judgment action to
determine whether its liability insurer had the obligation to defend and
indemnify the manufacturer from product liability claims.' 79  The
pharmaceutical company manufactured and marketed stilbestrol, or
diethylstilbestrol, also referred to as DES." ° Daughters of mothers who
had taken DES during pregnancy sued the pharmaceutical company. '
In order to determine whether the manufacturer had liability
coverage from 1954 to 1974, the court needed to construe five different
comprehensive general liability (CGL) policies that had been in effect
174. Id. But see Smith v. Gen. Cas. Ins. Co., 619 N.W.2d 882, 888 (holding the
"reasonable expectation of the insured regarding the language ... is not relevant to our
analysis of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4)(a)2.b") (emphasis added). Similar to Theis, the court in
Smith determined whether the 1993-1994 uninsured motorist statute required coverage when
an unidentified hit-and-run vehicle hits an intermediate vehicle, and the intermediate vehicle
then hits the insured. Smith, 619 N.W.2d at 883. Relying on Theis, both parties claimed that
the court should consider the policy of honoring the reasonable expectations of the insured.
Id. at 887. However, the court opined that "[t]he public policy purpose of honoring the
reasonable expectations of the insured is applied when the language of an insurance contract is
interpreted and construed.... The question to be decided here ... is not the construction of
the policy, but what the [statute] requires." Id. at 887-88 (emphasis added) (citing Kremers-
Urban Co. v. Am. Employers Ins. Co., 351 N.W.2d 156 (Wis. 1984)). The court decided Smith
approximately ten months after it decided Theis. Id.
175. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
176. Theis, 606 N.W.2d at 170.
177. 351 N.W.2d 156 (Wis. 1984).
178. Id. at 168. This approach is consistent with the fourth approach outlined supra Part
III.
179. Id. at 159.
180. Id. at 158. Physicians prescribed DES to pregnant women to prevent certain birth
related complications and estrogen deficiencies. Id.
181. Id. at 158-59. The plaintiffs filed forty-nine claims in sixteen different states. Id. at
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over this period." Specifically, the court had to determine if "there was
an 'occurrence' within the meaning of the various policy provisions, at a
time the policies were in force."'83
In one of the policies, the insurer agreed:
"To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall
become legally obligated to pay as damages because of:
"Coverage B-Bodily Injury Liability-Except Automobile
"bodily injury, caused by an occurrence, sustained by any
person."
"Occurrence" was defined in this policy to mean:
"(1) an event, or continuous or repeated exposure to conditions,
or (2) an accident, which causes bodily injury or property damage
during the policy period, which is neither expected nor intended
by the insured.. .. ",18
The court analyzed this provision and believed "[c]overage is
predicated... upon the event or accident which occurred during the
policy period."1  The court remarked that "[a]lthough the event or
accident which causes the bodily injury must occur during the policy
period, there is no provision that bodily injury must result during that
period. , 86 Thus, the court asserted that coverage would be triggered if
an event or accident had occurred during the policy period that caused
bodily injury.' s
In contrast, the insurer argued "that the phrase, 'during the policy
period,' modifies the phrase, 'bodily injury,' and not the words, 'event'
or 'accident.' ,,u According to the insurer, only bodily injury occurring
182. Id. at 159. Adding to the court's task, each of these policies contained different
language in their coverage provisions. Id. After 1966, liability insurers began using the word
"occurrence" rather than "accident" as the trigger of coverage. See id. at 166. The purpose of
this change was to expand coverage. Id.
183. Id. at 163 (quoting insurance policy language).
184. Id. at 165 (alteration in original). This policy was in effect from March 16, 1966 to
March 16,1968. Id.
185. Id. (emphasis added).
186. Id. (emphasis added).
187. Id. Essentially, the court believed the phrase "during the policy period" modified
the words "event" or "accident," not the phrase "bodily injury." Id.
188. Id. (quoting insurance policy language). The insurer also argued that the phrase
"which causes bodily injury or property damage" would be rendered superfluous by the
court's interpretation. Id. (citations omitted).
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during the policy period triggered coverage.189 The court replied to the
insurer's argument as follows:
To accept such a contorted construction of the policy language is
to deviate from our mandate to construe policies as would a
reasonable insured. A reasonable insured would understand that
the phrase, "during the policy period," modifies when the
occurrence (event or accident) must take place in order that
coverage under the policy be invoked .... There is no indication
when the bodily injury must result-only that the event or
accident which caused the bodily injury or property damage must
happen during the policy period.
A reasonable insured in the position of [the manufacturer] would
have understood that the ingestion of DES by pregnant mothers
and [the manufacturer's] marketing activities are events or
accidents which, if they allegedly happened during the policy
period and subsequently caused bodily injury, would trigger
coverage and [the insurer's] obligation to defend and pay on
behalf of [the manufacturer] all sums which it shall be obligated
to pay.1
90
As a result of this reasoning, the court held that an injury-causing event
or accident during the policy period triggered coverage in the policies
issued from 1966 to 1968.191
B. Which Approach Has Evolved in Wisconsin?
As Katze, Gross, Theis, and Kremers make clear, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court applies the doctrine of reasonable expectations under all
four of the approaches used by other courts.' 92 Further, the court's
application of all four approaches makes it difficult to determine which
189. Id.
190. Id. at 165-66 (emphasis added). The Kremers court also cited Handal in its
discussion of the rules of insurance contract interpretation. The court stated that "[t]he
reasonable expectations of coverage of the insured should be furthered by the interpretation
given." Id. at 163 (citing Handal v. Am. Farmers Mut. Cas. Co., 255 N.W.2d 903 (Wis. 1997)).
As noted earlier, the court in Handal applied Iowa law when it construed the insurance policy
at issue. See supra Part IV.A.3 n.171 for a discussion of this issue. Unlike Wisconsin, Iowa
has explicitly adopted the doctrine of reasonable expectations. See supra Part H.
191. Kremers, 351 N.W.2d at 166.
192. See supra Part III for a discussion of the four approaches to the doctrine of
reasonable expectations.
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approach the court will apply in any particular case. Indeed, how the
court approaches the doctrine has puzzled at least one Justice. In Gross,
Justice Abrahamson agreed with the majority's invocation of the
doctrine, but stated that "[t]he majority's application of the principle of
reasonable expectations is not entirely clear. The principle has more
than one meaning. ' 3 Thus, according to one Justice, confusion exists
regarding how the court will apply the doctrine of reasonable
expectations.
However, in the overwhelming majority of cases, the court applies
the doctrine of reasonable expectations as a tool of construction to
resolve ambiguity." In Katze, the court relied on the presence of
ambiguity to invoke the doctrine of reasonable expectations. 95 The
court limited the application of the insured's reasonable expectations to
what a particular term or clause meant and did not extend the doctrine
to promote fairness, 196 the purpose of insurance,1'9 or to protect third
parties.9 '
In others words, the court did not interject its own coverage
expectations into the interpretation of the policy. The court focused
solely on the language of the policy and determined what a reasonable
person in the position of an insured would have understood the words to
mean. '99 This "ambiguity" approach to the doctrine of reasonable
expectations represents the better approach because it confines the
court to its traditional role of interpreting the bargain struck between
the insured and insurer.
V. WHY THE WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT SHOULD FOLLOW KATZE
AND LIMIT ITS APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF REASONABLE
EXPECTATIONS TO A TOOL OF CONSTRUCTION
Gross, Theis, and Kremers illustrate some of the criticism
surrounding the doctrine of reasonable expectations. These criticisms
include judicial manipulation of clear policy language, misplaced
assumptions regarding the insurance bargaining process, judicial
193. Gross v. Lloyds of London Ins. Co., 358 N.W.2d 266, 272 n.1 (Wis. 1984)
(Abrahamson, J., concurring) (citing Rodman v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 208 N.W.2d
903,905-08 (Iowa 1973)).
194. See supra note 129.
195. Katze v. Randolph & Scott Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 341 N.W.2d 689,691 (Wis. 1984).
196. Gross, 358 N.W.2d at 271.
197. Theis v. Midwest Security Ins. Co., 606 N.W.2d 162, 168 (2000).
198. Kremers-Urban Co. v. Am. Employers Ins. Co., 351 N.W.2d 156,166 (Wis. 1984).
199. Katze, 341 N.W.2d at 692.
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overreaching, and increased premium costs.'
In Gross, the court relied heavily on the insured's knowledge of
standard insurance industry practice and language in order to find
coverage."1 In addition to ignoring the policy's unambiguous language,
the court assumed that the insured actually read and understood his old
policy. According to the court's analysis, the insured specifically knew
and understood the standard 1966 coverage provisions.""
However, most insureds do not read, yet even understand their
insurance policies.m If most insureds do not read their policies, then
they have no "reasonable expectations" of coverage from the policy
language. The "reasonable expectations of the insured" thus becomes a
legal fiction where the court inserts its own expectations of coverage.
This approach may fairly be characterized as judicial overreaching.
In a similar vein, Theis also illustrates judicial overreaching. In
Theis, the court granted coverage under an uninsured motorist provision
by relying on the purpose of uninsured motorist insurance and the
policy's language.24 A "reasonable insured" would not have expected
coverage when struck by a piece of an uninsured motor vehicle because
the policy clearly defined "uninsured motor vehicle" as a "motor vehicle
or trailer of any type."2"5 In addition to applying Iowa law, ' the court
simply interjected its own expectations of what the policy and the
uninsured motorist statute should cover. The court strayed from its
traditional role and no longer umpired the bargain struck between the
insurer and insured. By analyzing the purpose of the insurance
transaction and determining what should be covered, the court therefore
arguably took on the role of a legislative body.
Likewise, the Kremers decision represents judicial manipulation of
clear insurance contract language.m The court's conclusion that "during
the policy period" modified "event or accident" stretches the reasonable
200. See generally Rahdert, supra note 1, at 115-44 (discussing objections to the four
approaches of the doctrine of reasonable expectations); see also Ware, supra note 51, at 1468
(arguing that the doctrine of reasonable expectations should be abandoned).
201. See supra Part IV.A.2 for a discussion of the case. Indeed, Justice Abrahamson
wanted to remand the case to determine exactly what the insured knew and expected from his
aviation policy. Gross, 358 N.W.2d at 272 n.1 (Abrahamson, J., concurring).
202. See Gross, 358 N.W.2d at 271.
203. Ware, supra note 51, at 1479.
204. Theis v. Midwest Security Ins. Co., 606 N.W.2d 162,170 (Wis. 2000).
205. See supra note 167 for a relevant portion of the policy.
206. See supra note 173.
207. See supra Part IV.A.4 for a discussion of this case.
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insured test to an unworkable position.2 Contrary to the court's
assertion, a reasonable insured would not agree with the court's
interpretation of the policy because the policy did indicate that bodily
injury must have occurred "during the policy period."' Indeed, the
insurer would have been hard pressed to draft a clearer coverage
provision.
Ironically, the Kremers court discussed its role regarding the
interpretation of insurance policy language. After discussing that the
insurer should have used more limiting language regarding what types of
events or accidents trigger coverage, the court noted "[we] will not
rewrite the contract to create a new contract to release the insurer from a
risk it could have avoided through a more foresighted drafting of the
policy. 21  Nevertheless, the court did not hesitate to "rewrite" the 1966
to 1968 policy to bind the insurer to risks that it arguably avoided
through its drafting. The Kremers court firmly believed that freedom of
contract was subservient to the protection of third parties. Thus, it is the
supreme court who "contorted" the true meaning of the policy provision
and essentially eviscerated the bargain struck between the parties.
VI. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of reasonable expectations is a principle that relies
on the objectively "reasonable expectations of the insured" as a guide in
insurance contract interpretation. Under the doctrine of reasonable
expectations, courts often grant coverage to an insured even when the
express language of the policy does not provide coverage.?
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has applied four different
approaches to the doctrine of reasonable expectations. In the majority
of cases, the court has applied the doctrine as a tool of construction to
resolve ambiguity. This represents the best approach because it
confines the court to its traditional role of interpreting the bargain
struck between the insured and insurer. As such, the court should
208. Kremers-Urban Co. v. Am. Employers Ins. Co., 351 N.W.2d 156,165 (Wis. 1984).
209. Id. The court noted that "[tlhere is no indication when the bodily injury must
result-only that the event or accident which caused the bodily injury or property damage
must happen during the policy period." Id.
210. See supra note 185 and accompanying text for relevant policy language.
211. Kremers, 351 N.W.2d at 167 (emphasis added).
212. See id. at 165. The court characterized the insurer's interpretation of the policy as
"contorted." Id.
213. Rahdert, supra note 1, at 108.
214. Id.
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continue to limit its application of the doctrine of reasonable
expectations to a rule of construction to resolve ambiguity.
DAVID J. SENO*
* The author would like to give special thanks to Professor John J. Kircher for his
assistance during the writing process.
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